


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John Carter Brown.

pro. Canada

Report to Examination of Commercial
Principles in 1761.

THOUGHTS
ON
TRADE IN GENERAL,
OUR
WEST-INDIAN IN PARTICULAR,
OUR
CONTINENTAL COLONIES,
CANADA, GUADALOUPE,
AND THE
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES
OF
P E A C E.

ADDRESSED to the COMMUNITY.

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
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T O T H E

C O M M U N I T Y.

RIGHT notions of commercial connections are of the utmost importance to a trading nation ; and the fallacy of arguments tending to mislead it, whether adopted thro' weakness or design, ought to be detected e'er the public hath fixed it's opinion, and thereby become a *party* instead of remaining a *judge*. Such arguments abound in the *examination of the commercial principles of the late negotiation, &c. in 1761*, as I shall endeavour to show in the following pages, with as much brevity as is consistent with the subjects to be handled.

The plain design of the *Examiner* is to secure *Guadaloupe*. This leads him to speak of our trade to the *West-Indies* and our continental colonies, to lessen the value of *Canada*, to insist upon the importance of his favourite isles, and to censure the late negotiation on account of *that's* being to be restored, which he very weakly endeavours to show, and hopes he hath fully demonstrated,

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strated, to be far superior in value to every thing we should have acquired by that treaty*.

The *Examiner* is mightily for arguing from *facts*. Though I shall not confine myself wholly to this method, I shall attempt doing it, so far as to verify his own words, viz. *A dispassionate reader, when furnished with the proper facts, may form a system for himself. By his temper he may counteract the passions, and supply the deficiencies of his author; and whilst he is enabled to correct his mistakes, he will sometimes deduce from his facts a chain of consequences, which may possibly have escaped the writer, who originally furnished him with the materials of speculation*†.

Let us for a while range our thoughts under the following heads, TRADE in general, our WEST-INDIAN in particular, our CONTINENTAL COLONIES, CANADA, GUADALOUPE.

A mistake in the foundation, runs through the whole superstructure; and if the first principles are not right, the inferences, tho' drawn ever so fairly, will prove inconclusive. It is of consequence then, that, in treating of any particular branches of commerce, we should have just conceptions of TRADE in general.

Trade, as a mean, is the chief support of our independency. *Great-Britain* is situated near a nation, whose ambition, if seconded by a sufficient power, would soon prove fatal to our religion and

* See p. 17, 56, 67. † P. 7.

liberties. The smallness of our country, compared with *France*, is no disadvantage to us; but the smallness of our numbers. Were our inhabitants as numerous as those of *France*, we should derive an advantage from the smallness of our Island, as we should be better able to defend its coasts, than if as large again. But as we fall short of *France* in numbers, the security that we thereby lose must be made up by the superiority of our navy. The number of our inhabitants, and the strength of our navy added to each other, must put us upon a par with the *French*; and then the circumstance of our being an Island will give us a sufficient security against all hostile attempts from that ambitious people. Upon the supposition that we increased in populousness much more in proportion than the *French*, the strength of our navy might be decreased without danger, in the same degree as the strength of the inhabitants was increased; but if on the other hand the superior strength of our navy should increase with the growing strength of the inhabitants, our security is greatly promoted: and this is what may be naturally expected; however as the increase of inhabitants will not weaken our navy, and adds strength to the community, hence it appears of what importance it is to increase them, which should be done by removing as much as possible all those obstacles to matrimony by which numbers are kept single, and by encouraging such foreigners to settle among us, whose good behaviour we can rely upon. But then, as

it is not merely numbers that constitutes the strength of a community, but also the subordination of such numbers, their virtue, health and valour; and as these numbers will gradually decrease when the means of supporting themselves fail, and can be increased no longer than while such means continue, they must of necessity have some employment. This employment we may call *TRADE*; whenever it furnishes one individual with something that he exchanges with another, whether it consists in growing corn or in procuring furs. I am sensible that I use the word in a larger sense than common; as well as a different one, not for the *exchange* itself, but the *employ* belonging to such exchange: however, as the good arising to a trading nation springs not so much from the *exchange* itself as the *employ*, I shall think myself justified in using the word *Trade* as now mentioned.

Having cleared the way thus far, I go on to observe, that a small part of a large community being able to grow and get in order corn sufficient for the support of the whole, and to raise all other necessaries, which they will consider as their own property being procured by their own labours, the other part of the community must be employed in obtaining something to give in exchange; and whenever by reason of circumstances the poorer sort of people find it extremely difficult or next to impossible to procure by their industry, wherewithal to make an exchange for the necessaries, and some of the conveniencies of life, they are discouraged

couraged from entering into the married state, and the populousness of the community decreases. 'Tis necessary for the health, safety, and growth of the body politic, that there should be a mutual dependance between the several parts of it, owing to their different wants, inclinations and the like; and that this dependance should give employment to the whole. Where a nation is so extremely populous, as that it hath nothing to fear from neighbouring states, a trade within itself sufficient to give it full employ, will be all that is necessary; and if it hath only a home trade, gold and silver are not wanted to carry it on, any thing else may be substituted in the room of it, and an imaginary value be stamp'd upon it, giving it a currency among the inhabitants of such nation. We have an instance of this sort among the *Lacedæmonians* by order of their noted lawgiver *Lycurgus*.

If a navy is necessary to the securing of a state, then a trade with foreign parts becomes necessary, as what home trade may be carried on coastwise by shipping, will not suffice for the support of such navy. Let this foreign trade be good, and the larger it is the better, if carried on by your own ships and seamen, otherwise you are strengthening the navy of another state. Should this foreign trade be carried on with other states; you must adopt sentiments answerable to theirs, respecting gold and silver as the most valuable commodities to be bartered away for others, and must be careful

ful to have such supplies of them, as to be able therewith to command from foreign markets whatever is wanted towards your own safety ; whenever the seller will not be paid in other commodities, or only to such a proportion. The balance of trade is said to be in our favour, whenever the goods we send to foreign markets are more valuable than what we receive, so that we have a difference paid us in gold or silver ; but whenever the goods imported from a foreign market are more in value than the goods exported to the same, so that there is a difference which we are obliged to make up in gold or silver, the balance is against us. This balance of trade may be against us, and yet not be really prejudicial to us ; as the goods for which we pay our cash, may be exported with a profit upon them, for such useful commodities as we should otherwise have paid cash for. If indeed the goods for which we pay cash are not exported, and yet are no ways necessary to the safety of the community ; or are not exported for such commodities as are necessary, but for such as we should have done full as well or better without, then the balance of trade is prejudicial as well as against us, unless the number of ships and sailors employed in such trade should be so considerable as to answer for such balance. In reasonings of this kind there is nothing like illustration by known objects, to give the reader that ideas of what you are about. I will therefore illustrate what I have advanced, by the *East-India* trade.

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The balance of trade to the *East Indies* is much against us, so that there are yearly considerable exports of bullion, however it does not necessarily follow from thence that such trade is prejudicial. In order to know this it must be inquired, what *East-India* goods continue in the nation? how far such goods are necessary? whether the goods exported are not more than were purchased by the bullion? whether such exported goods do not answer at other markets for what must have been otherwise paid for in cash? and whether, if after all these things are considered, it should appear, that a certain quantity of bullion is drained off from the nation, the advantage arising from the employment of such a number of ships and sailors as are necessarily engaged in going to and from the *East-Indies*, and in carrying the companies goods to other markets, is not more than an equivalent for the loss of such bullion? but if it could be made appear, that such ships and sailors are wanted for the carrying on of a more profitable trade, that the *East-India* goods exported do not answer for cash, and serve only to introduce others we should have done without, and that such of them as are necessary for our own use added to those exported that may answer for cash, do not equal in value the bullion exported to the *East-Indies*, then the trade however profitable to the company is prejudicial to the country, and tends to drain off that bullion, without which you cannot go to the markets of foreign states for the most useful and necessary

cessary commodities, if the balance of trade is against you. While we deal with foreign states, there must be upon the whole, that balance of trade in favour of our country, that shall enable us to purchase naval stores and the like, or a main part of our defence must fail us; for we have no gold or silver mines to supply us. Now whatever branch of commerce tends, after all that can be said in its favour, to lessen this balance upon the whole, such commerce is certainly prejudicial, and ought to be declined.

The above thoughts, though they will hold good with regard to our trading with foreign states, will not do it when applied to our colonies. Was the trade of the mother country and its colonies to be confined to each other, and could they in each other meet with all that either wants for its security, however divided by distance, they would still be as one nation: the interfering ocean should be only as a large river dividing between two countries; and the ships employed in navigating between them, as bridges and water-carriages. In this case gold and silver would be no more necessary, than if they were absolutely one nation: but if the use of it is adopted out of conveniency, as a measurement by which to judge of the value of each others commodities, the mother country is not prejudiced by any balance of trade that is against her, supposing that she does not suffer her bullion to be exported to her colonies, but obliges the colonist to come and enjoy the balance in the
mother

mother country; for here she receives in the person of the colonist the balance against her, returned into her own bosom. A disadvantage its true may arise to the mother country, from the colonies having the balance on their side; supposing that the colonists are so enriched by that balance upon coming to the mother country, that they get into the management of affairs, and can influence to those measures, that at the same time that they are serviceable to the colonies, are a hurt to the mother country. An instance of this nature had nearly happened, when a strong push was made to prevent the distilling of corn, tho' sufficiently cheap to admit of it, and to confine the distiller to the use of molosses; and when one of the first trading cities in the world was drawn in to petition on the wrong side, where the dispute was not, whether distilling should be suffered, but whether the *British land-holder* or the *West-Indian planter* should have the benefit of it.

A nation having colonies may reap an advantage from them, not only by supplying itself, but by drawing from thence commodities for the markets of other states; and tho' there is no gain upon such commodities, and it is but barely paid for carrying them from place to place, yet it hath a considerable benefit from the number of ships, and sailors, and other hands that are employed in doing it. Let it be remark'd, that it is not so much the gain of any particular trade, as the quantity of shipping, and persons employed in carrying it

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on, that makes it beneficial to the community. A losing trade to individuals, may on this account be so beneficial to the public, as to make it a matter of prudence for the state to give an equivalent in bounties for such loss, that so it may continue to be carried on.

Colonies should be traded with as much as possible, and should be encouraged to grow those articles, for which the mother country is obliged to go to another state; and it is to the advantage of the mother country, to promote the growth of them by large bounties, rather than pay cash for them to foreigners. The bodies and estates of the colonists are as much the riches of our country, as tho' comprehended within the same territory; and methods may be fallen upon, to make them as useful to the community, as the inhabitants of two different counties. Hence it follows, that bounties given to the colonies are of no disservice to us. The bounty returns tho' in another shape; and there's a saving to the nation by the growth of the goods encouraged by the bounty. To explain this point, let us suppose, that fifty thousand pounds were given away in encouraging the growth of a hundred thousand pounds worth of hemp; such hemp would stand us in a 150,000 l. but then the 100,000 l. that we must have paid for it in cash, had we purchased it in *Russia*, would remain in our hands; and 'twould be strange if the materials of the goods, with which we should pay the 150,000 l. were worth any thing like two thirds of the sum: but
then

but then this thought must be taken into the account, that the labour employed in working up such materials was redundant, and could not have been put to a more valuable use.

A nation and its colonies may trade in the same articles, the growth of their several lands, to the same market, and yet the mother country not be injured by it; yea, tho' the goods of the last may not fetch the advanced price, they would otherwise have done; for, tho' they may not fetch that advanced price, they may fetch a sufficient to answer the ends of trade; the goods of the mother country and its colonies may together produce much more than the first alone would have done, tho' they had borne an advanced price; and what the colonies gain by such trade may be laid out with the mother country. The colonies, by trading to the same market with the same articles, may serve only to exclude foreigners from rivaling their mother country, and pocketing that cash, which at length comes into the lap of the latter.

Thus much for trade in general, now for our WEST-INDIAN in particular. This is certainly of great importance, and ought not to be depreciated: but it bespeaks no small ignorance or inattention, to place that importance, in the value of the goods imported from the *West-Indies*. Were the imports from thence worth but half as much, and yet double the quantity, the trade would be twice as advantageous as at present. 'Tis the quantity

of shipping and men employed, in and by means of it, that makes it so valuable to the community. The balance of trade in favour of our *West-Indian* islands would prove at length extremely prejudicial to us, was it not, that a great part of it is sunk, by exchanging it for the balance due from the islands to the continental colonies, and for which the accounts of the latter, with the mother country, are credited; and that the other part of it which remains standing, is not discharged by bullion, sent to the *West-Indies*: but the colonist is obliged either to make purchase of it in stock, land, or the like, or to come over and enjoy it. The trade to *Africa*, which depends much upon our *West-Indian*, is indeed lucrative; but if it was less lucrative, and the shipping employed in it much more numerous, it would be more beneficial by far to the community. When the *Examiner* begs leave to repeat it, and to fix it in the reader's memory that the African trade centers in, and is supported by the *West-Indies* *, many of his readers are thereby led to conclude, that it centers wholly in, and is altogether supported by them; and he hath been careful not to prevent their making this conclusion, by mentioning the numbers of negroes that are employed in our continental colonies, particularly *Virginia* and the *Carolina's*. The mention of this would not have favoured his design, which is, not so much to shew the necessity of our *West-Indian*

* Page 28.

territories being increased, as to prevent *Guadeloupe's* being restored.

Whatever other writers may have unwarily advanced, an increase of *sugar land* would be of advantage to our country, provided the planter, when he hath made his fortune, does not come over and receive it, and then carry it to *France* or some other country; which was he to do, we should certainly be losers, unless, besides paying ourselves for the freight, &c. we should receive from foreign markets in return for his goods, the balance we should have to pay him. Let us see what would be the consequence had we more *sugar land*. More sugars would be brought to market, and therefore a greater quantity of shipping and sailors be employed. The consumption of sugar must be encreased, or the commodity must be exported, to keep up its present value. If exported, an equivalent of some sort would be received for it, and thereby the national stock be encreased. Should not the exports be sufficient to carry off the quantity thrown in upon us by the increase of our *sugar land*, and should the community refuse increasing their consumption at the present prices, the commodity would lower, be bought up, and consumed at the under price, and the community be benefited by that fall, though the growers would have smaller gains.

If the increased *sugar land* is uncultivated, then the planters undertaking to cultivate it, must procure themselves a stock of negroes, which must be

be supplied by the *African* trader, as well as be maintained by him afterwards. Not only so, but a new market is actually provided for the continental colonist, at which to dispose of his plank, lumber, staves and provision. But if the increase is by the acquisition of cultivated *sugar land*, the case is altered. The planters are stocked already, and the *African* trader is wanted, no further than to keep it up. No new market is opened for the continental colonist, for he traded to the same place before. This brings me to a main argument, used by the *Examiner* to prove the necessity of our increasing our *West-Indian* territory. His words are, *There is another consideration relative to this trade, still more important in itself, and more essential in the present examination, because it will point out to us how ill we consult the interest of North America herself, either relatively to her own particular prosperity, or to her intercourse with us, when we happen, as I conceive we have in this treaty, to neglect the West-Indian commerce.*

For several of the most considerable commodities of North America, there exists no other market whatever, than the West-Indian islands. In a word, it is by means of the West-Indian trade, that a great part of North America is at all enabled to trade with us. So that in reality the trade of these North American provinces, when stated in its true light, is, as well as that of Africa, to be regarded but as a dependent*

* Page 28, 29.

member, and subordinate department of the West-Indian trade; it must rise and fall exactly as the West-Indies flourish or decay *. The Examiner professes in a subsequent paragraph his zeal for the continental colonies, but adds, *I should be sorry it were found to be a zeal without knowledge*. I am sorry that his zeal for the *West-India* is a zeal without knowledge, or without honesty. Who would not suppose in reading the above quotations, but that the Examiner understood by *West-Indies*, our own *West-Indian* islands, and was insisting upon the dependance of our continental colonies on these. But if so, what becomes of his argument, when he writes but a little lower, *our sugar colonies would suffer much less from a deficiency in North America, than those of France, to whose prosperity the trade with the English northern colonies is more necessary by far, than it is to the English West-Indies*. In another place †, *the North American trade has extended; because it found a market, not indeed in the English, but in the French sugar colonies*. Acquisition in the *West-Indies* must increase our limited and decaying sugar trade, and at the same time recall our, extensive indeed, but erring trade of North America, from French to English markets. Thus the Examiner acknowledges, that our *North American* colonies have an extensive trade with the *French West-Indian* islands. Pray what advantage then would it be to the *North American* colonies, to have these islands

* Page 30. † Page 36.

secured to the *English*, unless their *extensive* trade with them should be thereby extended? They have an extensive trade with them now they are *French*; they would have but the same were they *English*. This extensive trade the *Examiner* stiles *erring*: in what sense? The *English* islands are supplied to the full, and upon as good terms as tho' the continental colonists did not trade with the *French*: and the *Examiner* allows*, that it is owing to this trade, together with the *West-Indian* trades being cramped for want of land, that the *West-Indian* trade has not increased in proportion to that of *North America*. There is no more error in our continental colonies trading to the *French* islands with lumber, provision, and the like articles, the produce of the country, than there is in *Great Britain's* trading to *France* with corn, lead, and coal. The advantage gained by the colonist from that trade, enables him to increase his trade with the mother country. But as he hath this trade, what necessity is there for retaining acquisitions upon his account? *Guadaloupe* traded with *North America* before the war, and now she has been conquered, only continues to carry on a greater trade, than any *English* island does with *North America* †. What pity is it! that he who owns a consideration of things out of their due order, is often worse than no consideration of them at all ‡, should not consider better. The *Examiner*, when ac-

* Page 35, 36. † Page 43. ‡ Page 31.

counting for the manner in which the balance on the side of the *West-Indies* is answered for, adds, that this is done, thirdly, *in the great sums spent by the West-Indian planters resident in England; whereas we derive scarce any advantage of that kind, from any of the continental plantations to the northward* *. These words imply, that there is an advantage arising to us from the great sums spent by the planters among us. But where's the advantage, when such sums are what they receive from us in balance. The only advantage consists in its being spent among us, and not among foreigners; but it's first paid by us before it's spent among us. And the reason why we have scarce any advantage of this kind, none worth mentioning, from any of the continental plantations to the northward, is a very good one, and what we should rejoice in, viz. the balance of trade with them is greatly in our favour.

The *Examiner* intimates the propriety of increasing our sugar land from our not having enough for the consumption of all our *British* dominions †. And yet he asserts ‡ that *the fact is, that the whole produce of Guadaloupe, except cotton, is exported*. Whereto? Not to our *American* colonies or *Ireland*, for if so doubtless he would have mentioned it. Besides, *Guadaloupe continues to carry on a greater trade, than any English island does, with North America; and in Ireland they use only some sugars and syrups* ||, a small some. If then the *Guadaloupe*

* P. 35. † Page 18. ‡ Page 61. || Page 18.

sugars are exported to a foreign market, and are not wanted in a time of war to supply the consumption of our *British* dominions, much less will they be wanted in a time of peace, when our *North American* colonies have an extensive trade with the *French* islands, and *Ireland* may come in for a share with them. The *Examiner* to help on his design, endeavours to alarm our fears by instilling an apprehension of danger, with regard to our possessions in the *West-Indies*. *Guadaloupe* lies to the windward of *Antigua*, *Nevis*, *Monferrat*, *St. Kits*, and all that cluster of small *English* islands, and consequently those islands are most liable to be attacked from thence, if it returns to *France*, and this island is most capable of protecting them if it remains in our hands, it is certainly very extraordinary that all should be sacrificed to the idea of security in *North America*, where we were infinitely stronger than the *French*, and that no notion of danger should be entertained for our valuable possessions in the *West-Indies*, where we are infinitely weaker than the *French* *. But it is more extraordinary, that the *Examiner* should attempt to alarm us with an apprehension of danger, from the situation of *Guadaloupe*, and the strength of the *French* in the *West-Indies*, when not only that, but all their other islands, *Domingo*, and *St. Cruz* excepted, have been taken from them, and are in the number of our conquests.

Now let us turn our thoughts to our CONTINENTAL COLONIES, and consider their *intrinsic*, *comparative*, and *adventitious* value.

* Page 66, the note.

Their *intrinsic* value consists in their *trade, situation, strength* and *fruitfulness*. The aggregate sum of the exports and imports to and from *North America*, in the year 1758, amounted to 2,481,631 l. 14 s. 2 d. The goods amounting to this sum, being many (if not most) of them of a bulky nature, must necessarily employ a considerable quantity of shipping and seamen in transporting them : but besides the great advantage arising from thence, it must be observed, that of these goods 1,832,948 l. 13 s. 10 d. worth, were exported from the mother country, and that numbers of our own inhabitants were employed in making them up. The balance of trade with our continental colonies, is in our favour to the amount of 1,184,265 l. 13 s. 6 d. Now tho' the balance of trade, may be against the mother country, in favour of her colonies, without her being essentially prejudiced thereby, so as to require her giving it up ; as when the colonist is obliged to come and spend that balance in her own land, as before observed : yet there is, certainly, a considerable advantage in her having the balance in her own favour. Her own manufacturers are maintained by working up the goods to be exported, and the colonies are obliged to remit the cash, procured by their trading to other places, to pay off the balance ; and it is in this way that our continental colonies are drained of the gold and silver, that they receive in return for their provisions, &c. sold to the *French* and others. Whenever the balance of trade is against a colony, that colony must pay the difference in good bills

or in cash, or she will be no longer trusted by the mother country; and whenever the means of supplying herself with these fail, she must contrive to increase her exports, by growing or procuring what will find a sale in the mother country, or she must lessen her imports.

But while I am speaking to the trade of our continental colonies, I must not omit their extensive trade to the *West-Indies*, both *French* and *English*, and to other places, from whence they collect wherewith to pay us the balance. By means of this trade, they nurse up and employ a number of sailors, shipwrights, and others, that may upon occasion be serviceable to the navy of the mother country.

Thus much for the *trade* of the continental colonies, now for their *situation*, which reckoning from the northernmost part of the peninsula of *Nova Scotia* (to which the *French* were for confining us) to the southernmost part of *Georgia*, lies between 46° and $31^{\circ} 30'$ north latitude, and therefore admits of their growing all the *European* commodities, for tho' *Russia* is more to the northward, yet hemp and flax may be grown in a warmer climate. Wines, oils, and fruits, might be raised in one or other of our continental colonies, as well as in *France*, *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Italy*, or the *Madeiras*; not only so, but that very article of *cotton* for the sake of which the *Examiner* argues, that we ought to retain *Guadeloupe*. *Georgia* is sufficiently warm, to favour the growth of it. That more *European* commodities are not raised in our continental colonies, is not owing

owing to want of territory, but of people and encouragement. The *northern* colonies (I speak not of *Nova Scotia*) which are by far the most populous, are discouraged from raising any quantities of hemp and flax, because they make better of their lands, by growing corn and the like for the *West-Indies*, and other places: the *southern* can employ all their hands in raising tobacco, indigo, rice, silk, &c. or if any of them could be spared for the cultivation of different commodities, it is not done because of the difficulties attending the introduction of a new branch of business. The prudent planter will stick to his tobacco, indigo, rice, &c. while he can procure a support from them, tho' they do not yield him the same gains as formerly, rather than hazard his ruin by cultivating the vine, the olive, and the like, with which he is but little acquainted, when at an utter uncertainty, whether his commodity will fetch its prime cost at market. But let him be properly informed, the necessary lights be given him, and a suitable encouragement be proposed, and he will attempt the growth of new articles. I shall be heartily glad to find, that the premiums proposed, by the *Society for the encouragement of arts, manufactures, and commerce*, prove effectual for the introduction of new branches of trade among our colonists. Whether its views are answered or no, it hath made a noble attempt. But should not premiums prevail, necessity will at length oblige the colonies to grow other commodities, and to betake themselves to new branches of trade; and this necessity will be brought

brought upon them by the increase of their numbers. Their present branches of trade will, after a few years, be insufficient to support the inhabitants, who multiply in an amazing degree; and when insufficient for that, necessity, the mother of invention, will force them to introduce others; and the extent of the country will favour the introduction of them. However, as it may prove detrimental to the present branches of trade, to leave things 'till they come to this crisis, it would be in character for the Legislature, to encourage, by proper bounties, the introduction of others, 'till they had got root sufficient to support themselves.

I go on to make some observations on the *strength* of our colonies, by which I understand the capacity they are in, of seconding our operations against an enemy, which ought by no means to be overlooked. The greatest conquest made the last war was effected by the colony troops, I refer to the reduction of *Cape Breton*. They have also been extremely serviceable in the present, and contributed to the taking of *Louisbourg*, *Martinico*, and the *Havannah*, not to mention *Montreal*, and other places, at the back of their own settlements. I shall not say, that all the colonies have done their duty, in seconding a war began in their defence; what I mean to assert is, that without *their men*, either in the provincial or government *American* regiments, we could not have made the figure we have done in the war; for our own country hath
been

been drained, notwithstanding, what with regulars and militia. Our navy, I apprehend, has not received any thing like the advantage from our colonies, that the army has done. But in a future period, both may receive a much greater, from the *fruitfulness* of our colonies: I intend not, the fruitfulness of the land, but of the inhabitants. How it is in the *southern* colonies I know not, but the people of the *northern*, independent of foreign recruits, double themselves in twenty-five years, as is allowed by the *Examiner* *. We may reasonably conclude then, that, in the space of fifteen years, we may raise out of our continental colonies, an army of twenty thousand men (especially if they have no enemy at their back) which may be employed, in case of a fresh rupture with *France*, against her *West-Indian* islands, or upon other services, while our own manufacturers are spared. Whoever is acquainted with the situation of places, knows that it is much safer and easier, to carry on expeditions, against the *West-Indies* or parts adjacent, from our colonies than from hence; and then, a great saving may be made in the article of transport service, by hiring what ships can be got upon the spot, which will cut off the enemies supplies of provision. The strength, which in a few years the fruitfulness of our colonies will give them, if not diverted by defending their back settlements, and rendered unnecessary for the security of their

* Page 83.

coasts, by the superiority of our fleets, properly managed and directed, will, upon a new war, render the tenure of the *French* islands extremely precarious to the mother country, and it will not be any garrisons, that *France* can maintain in them for any long time, that can insure them.

The next thing to be considered, is, the *comparative* value of our continental colonies. I mean not to compare particular colonies, with particular *West-Indian* islands, much less with the whole of them; but the whole of the one, with the whole of the other; and I hope to show by this comparison, that the advantage is greatly on the side of our continental colonies, against our *West-Indian* islands, tho' it may not be in proportion to the inhabitants of each. It is not with any pleasure I enter upon this comparison, as some may be ready to interpret it, into an attempt to disparage our *West-Indies*, while it's only intended to prevent mistaken apprehensions of colony interests. The *Examiner*, in shewing the importance of our *West-Indian* commerce, tells us *, *that almost the whole of that extensive and lucrative trade, which we carry on with the coast of Africa, is maintained by, and must be put to the account of the West-Indies; and then adds below, of fire arms, ammunition, utensils, stuffs, and spirits, we exported in the year 1761, to the value of 254,381 l. 11 s. 5 d. besides, an assortment of East-India goods, to the amount of*

78,576 l. 18 s. 6 d. The reader concludes, that the exportation of these goods to *Africa* is owing to our *West-Indian* islands. But herein he mistakes. These goods were exported in 1761; and the *Examiner* informs us *, that this present year *the negroes sold at Guadaloupe were not fewer than 4000*, which he supposes amounted to 120,000 l. The negroes sold at *Guadaloupe* this year, were without doubt purchased by the goods exported to *Africa* the last: and therefore, there must be deducted from the account of the exports to *Africa*, occasioned by our own *West-Indian* commerce, the prime cost of the negroes sold at *Guadaloupe*, reckoning to that cost, the sunken value of those that died in the passage, and by one accident, and another, never arrived at market, which we will set at 78,576 l. 18 s. 6 d. the value of the *East-India* goods. I may have over-rated them, but think that trade sufficiently lucrative, that clears one third, to pay for freight and satisfy the merchant. How came the *Examiner* to take the exports to *Africa* of the year 1761, a year, in which they were greatly increased by the view of purchasing negroes for the market at *Guadaloupe*? Was it owing to artifice or oversight? If he had meant to have given his reader the true state of the case, he should have taken the exports to *Africa* before the war, he should have shewn how many of these goods, were bartered away for negroes, and not for gold-

dust, elephants teeth, or other articles, and how many of these negroes were disposed of, in our *West-Indian* islands, and how many at our continental markets; but this would not have favoured his design. The *Examiner* says *, that scarce any part of *Guadaloupe* is fully flaved, that this island yielded *the last year, more than a third of the whole of what we imported from all our old West-Indian plantations put together* †, and that, for an age to come in the English hands, it would be the very best market for slaves ‡; from hence we may infer, that our old *West-Indian* plantations (of which we are speaking in this comparison of the *West-Indies* and continental colonies) did not take off annually 10,000 negroes, more especially when it's considered, how well these plantations are flaved, and that *Guadaloupe* might buy the more freely under an apprehension, that she should soon return to *France*, and then not be able to supply herself upon terms equally advantageous. These 10,000 negroes, according to the above estimate, would amount to 196,442 l. 6 s. 3 d. or in other words, the goods truckt away for the negroes, which after all accidents should supply the *West-Indian* markets with 10,000, would be worth no more than 196,442 l. 6 s. 3 d. instead of 254,381 l. 11 s. 5 d. But if, as I judge the case is, I have set the gains of the negroe trader too low, and these should be cent. per cent. which I believe to be nearer the mark, then

* Page 48. † Page 49. ‡ Page 49.

for the negroes, out of which upon his getting to market he had 10,000 to dispose of, at 30 l. a head, he bartered away goods to the value of only 150,000 l. This will shew how little reason there was for the *Examiner's* placing the exports to *Africa* of 1761, amounting in the whole (the assortment of *East-Indian* goods included) to 332,958 l. 9 s. 11 d. to the account of the *West-Indian* commerce. But that the goods bartered away for negroes to be sold in the *West-Indies* did not amount in 1758 to 254,381 l. 11 s. 5 d. we may conclude, upon the following account. In that year there was a balance due from *Great Britain* to the *West-Indies* of 956,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. Now if the prime cost of the negroes amounted to the above sum, then the trader would have for them at the *West-Indian* market reckoning his gain at fifty per cent. 381,572 l. 7 s. 1 d. $\frac{1}{2}$; let this be deducted from the above balance, and there remains 574,891 l. 15 s. 1 d. $\frac{1}{2}$. But this will not admit of the *West-Indian* planters taking upon themselves the payment of a very large part of that excessive North American deficiency that amounts to 1,184,265 l. 13 s. 6 d. and also of their spending very great sums in *England*, according to the *Examiner's* representation of matters *. But if the profit of the negroe trade is to be reckoned at the rate of cent. per cent. then they would have only 447,700 l. 19 s. 5 d. to pay such large part of the *North American* deficiency,

* Page 34, 35.

and to supply them with such great sums. It is reasonable to suppose then upon the whole, that the value of the goods bartered for negroes on the coasts of *Africa* to be sold in the *West-Indies*, does not amount to more than 150,000 l. at which estimate we will fix it. This 150,000 l. added to the exports, gives us the whole value of the goods taken off by the *West Indian* commerce, and together amounted in 1758 to 1,027,571 l. 19 s. 11 d. but this falls vastly short of the exports to our continental colonies the same year, which, without reckoning any thing for the goods with which the negroes bought by them are purchased on the coast of *Africa*, came to 1,832,948 l. 13 s. 10 d. Thus we see, that when the most has been made of the *West-Indian* commerce, that with our continental colonies exceeds it by 805,376 l. 13 s. 11 d. in point of exports, and therefore helps to support, as many more of our manufacturers as are employed in making up the goods amounting to the said sum. The reader will have a clear idea of the matter from the following state of the account.

Exports to our Continental Colonies			Trade to the <i>West Indies</i>		
l.	s.	d.	l.	s.	d.
1,832,948	13	10	direct exports	877,571	19 11
			indirect to <i>Africa</i> , to purchase Negroes for the <i>West Indies</i>	150,000	0 0
1,027,571	19	11		1,027,571	19 11

805,376 l. 13 s. 11 d. nearer four-fifths than three-fourths of all the trade to the *West-Indies* whether

ther direct or indirect. I have not charged the negroes at the price they fetch, but at the price they cost, as the advanced price at which they are sold is the profit of the *African* trader, and does not properly belong to the account, and as his gains are paid in sugar directly or indirectly (the balance with the *West-Indies* being so much against us) a commodity eaten up among ourselves. By this time the reader I hope is fully convinced, how much more important our trade to our continental colonies, is, than that to the *West-Indies*. But says the *Examiner* *, accounting for the manner of our balancing with the *West-Indian*, this is done, first, *by our West-Indies taking upon themselves the payment of a very large part of that excessive North American deficiency, a fact that would clearly have shewn the dependance of North America on that trade, without which our North American colonies could never pay for, nor consequently take off, our manufactures.* Here, as well as elsewhere, he makes our trade to our continental colonies to depend upon our *West-Indian* islands. But did not our continental colonies trade with our *West-Indian* islands, still our trade to the colonies would be greater than our trade to the *West-Indies*. There is a balance in favour of the *West-Indies* against our country to the amount of 956,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. out of this balance the *African* trader is to be paid for his negroes, which, reckoning his gains at cent. per cent. and the negroes purchased, as above at 150,000 l.

* Page 34.

make 300,000 l. This 300,000 l. deducted from the balance due to the *West-Indies*, leaves 656,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. out of this *the planters resident in England spend very great sums*, which we cannot set at less than 100,000 l. and then there is left 556,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. all which we will suppose goes towards paying the *North American* deficiency in return for goods had from the continent ; but was the trade between our continental colonies and the *West-Indies* to be at an end, and our continental colonies to be thereby obliged to reduce the exports from *England* to 556,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. less, still the exports would amount to 1,276,484 l. 11 s. 7 d. near upon 250,000 l. more than the whole trade to the *West-Indies* as above stated. Our prodigious trade then to our continental colonies, does not depend upon our *West-Indies*, so as the *Examiner* hath represented. If indeed, by means of the *West-Indies*, our exports to the continental colonies amount to 556,464 l. 2 s. 3 d. more than they would otherwise do, we thence infer the importance of the *West-Indies* to *England*, but not the dependance of the colonies upon our *West-Indies*. There's a mutual intercourse between these two, from whence arises an advantage to each, making them dependant upon one another. The *West-Indian* depends as much upon the colonist for being supplied with lumber, plank, staves, and provision, as the colonist does upon the *West-Indian* for taking these commodities off his hands : nay, was the trade between the continental colonies and
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the *West-Indies* to be prohibited, and were the latter to be confined in their purchase of these commodities to the market of the mother country, it could scarce be questioned, whether such prohibition would not prove almost or altogether fatal to the sugar planter. The continental colonies could do better without our *West-Indies*, than the latter could without the former; and therefore it is a gross misrepresentation, to make our continental colonies and our trade with them, dependant upon the *West-Indies*. In one thing indeed our *West-Indian* commerce has the advantage of our *North-American*, as the imports and exports of the former when put together exceed those of the latter. The joint sum of imports from and exports to the *West-Indies* amounts to 2,711,608 l. 2 s. 1 d. whereas the exports and imports to and from the continental colonies arise to no more than 2,481,631 l. 14 s. 2 d. Supposing then that the commodities on each side are equally bulky, and that the *West-Indies* (notwithstanding the balance is much in their favour) confine themselves to the taking off a proportionable quantity with the continental colonies of those goods that employ the most manufacturers, a greater number of shipping are engaged in going to and from the *West-Indies*, than in going to and from our continental colonies, and the exports to the *West-Indies* are equally advantageous to the mother country with the exports to the continental colonies, in the proportion that these exports bear to each other. But as the exports to
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our continental colonies exceed those to the *West-Indies* by 805,376 l. 13 s. 11 d. our trade with the former must employ a prodigious number of hands more than our trade with the latter, near upon four fifths more. As to the great, the *very great sums* spent among us by the planters they are gained from us, and bear but very little proportion to the great sums sent in by our continental colonies in bills or cash, to be spent among us by our own inhabitants in a way of trade; and then fifty thousand pounds spent in this way, whereby a number of people are supported, are better to the nation than a hundred thousand spent in high living, extravagance, and debauchery, tending to introduce a corruption of manners, and by ruining the morals of mankind to destroy the community.

But of all the advantages, that our continental colonies have over the *West-Indies*, none equals that arising from their extent of territory, in which particular the *West-Indies* bear no manner of proportion to them. The *Examiner* allows, *that our West-Indian trade has been cramped* merely for want of land *; and so it would be in a short time had we *Guadaloupe*: for tho' the possession of *Guadaloupe* would have increased our *West-Indian* trade; yet, as after that had been cultivated to the utmost, we should have been able to have vented more sugars, what with the foreign and home consumption, the trade would have still been cramp-

* Page 36.

ed for want of land. Continental sugar land is the only certain remedy for curing our sugar trade of the cramp; the adding of another island to our *West Indies* would only have afforded a temporary relief, not but that this is better than none. As continental sugar land is the only certain remedy for this disorder, so it's the only certain one against the engrossment of plantations, by which the planter is enabled, to fix what price he pleases upon his commodity in our own markets. Where we have this continental sugar land, or continental land, admitting of the growth of the sugar cane, I hope to shew in another place. But, to close the comparison between our continental colonies and *West-Indies*, with observing that there is no probability that the former will be cramped *merely for want of land* while the world standeth, and to enter upon the consideration of the *adventitious* value of our continental colonies.

The *adventitious* value of our continental colonies, consists in their being capable of receiving, whatever numbers the increasing populousness of the mother country may force from their native soil; in the protection they afford to our *American* fishery; and in the amazing difference there is between their being in our hands and in the hands of the *French*. Such is their capaciousness, that our own country need never be overstocked, nor our countrymen, be obliged to go among a people of a strange language in order to their procuring a livelihood: let them but carry honesty and industry

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along with them, and if favoured with the blessings of health and strength, they will be able to support themselves comfortably in one or other of our colonies, and by being with those that speak the same tongue, and have the same customs with themselves, will forget that they are not in the land of their nativity. However it may not be attended to in common, it is certainly an advantage to a country, to possess colonies that can take off its superfluous hands, and turn them to a valuable account; when otherwise they must have been lost to it, or have proved a burden if not a nuisance. This advantage I hope we shall derive from our continental colonies and acquisitions, when the peace shall have cut off from thousands the present means of subsistence; that so humanity may not be shocked with seeing the soldier or sailor begging bread or hanging at the gallows, who but a little before fought the battles of his country with undaunted courage. But of this more particularly elsewhere, and to mention, that our continental colonies, one and another of them, are by means of their situation of no small service to our *American* fishery. They serve to cover and protect it; and afford convenient harbours for our shipping to repair to on an emergency, as was the case when the *French* had taken *St. John's* in *Newfoundland*; besides the utility they are of, by their markets, to the persons employed in such fishery. This fishery could not be so secure, extensive, or profitable, was it not for our continental colonies. But what

what an amazing difference is there between the continental colonies being in our hands and in the hands of the *French*! for had they these, they would soon ruin this valuable fishery, as to our concern in it, and not only so but in time our whole trade. The continental colonies being in our hands, we have a most extensive trade with them. They drain off some of the riches of the *French West-Indies* in return for their provision, plank, &c. They supply our own *West-Indies* upon easy terms, with commodities, that these could not have from *England*, or upon such terms only, as would be too heavy for them by that time they arrived at the place of destination. But were they in the hands of the *French*, we should lose all our present trade with them, which would be thrown into our enemy's scale. The *French* would soon possess themselves of our *West-Indies*, or so cramp our *West Indian* trade as greatly to lessen its value: they would want no more corn from us, but would import it from *America*: they would be in the high road to universal monarchy, and our very independency would be endangered. The preservation of the continental colonies, we may deem, as things are now circumstanced, essential to our continuing a free people; and therefore ought to have the second place in our thoughts. Our ministry acted wisely then, in paying the attention they did to them, in the negotiation of 1761; and in providing for their security, by stipulating for the cession of all *Canada*.

But this necessarily brings me to speak of CANADA; in doing of which I shall observe, that our continental colonies could not have had a sufficient security, without the possession of *all Canada*: shall shew how far the possession of *Canada* secures them; and then insist upon the advantages to be drawn from *Canada* as a colony.

I observe, that our continental colonies could not have had a sufficient security, without the possession of *all Canada*. The faithfulness and ambition of the *French* are too notorious to admit of our supposing, that our colonies could have been safe with them in their neighbourhood, any further, than as our colonies were possessed of a force to defend themselves and offend their neighbours. It may be said, that our colonies would have had this force in their superior numbers, had *Canada* reduced to its proper limits, remained to the *French*. Very true, were our divided colonies formed into one body, and united under one governor. But this union is no ways desirable, as in the end it might breed a new monarchy; and pave the way to their setting up for themselves, and throwing off their dependance upon the mother country. 'Tis to our advantage, that our *American* dominions on the continent should be split into many governments, having different interests, making the whole dependant upon ourselves. This multiplicity of governments and difference of interests, tho' an advantage to us, is a weakening to them, and makes them the less capable of opposing a
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common enemy ; yea, shall be preventive of their uniting to repel him, as hath been seen in this present war. The *Canadians* strengthened by a military force from *France*, tho' not able to cope with our continental colonies, if firmly united and determined upon acting vigorously and together as one body, would be capable of conquering one and another of them in a separate and disjointed condition ; and if the *French* had once possessed themselves of any one colony, and fixed themselves firmly on the sea-coasts, they would in time have swallowed up the rest, or have spoilt in a great measure their usefulness to the mother country. That the *French* had a settled scheme of falling upon some of our colonies, and were making provision for the execution of the same, there is no room to doubt of. They were put upon this scheme, or encouraged in the prosecution of it, by the tameness of the *British* ministry, and the stoical indifference with which it heard from time to time that they were making encroachments and erecting one fort after another, instead of issuing orders to our continental colonies to oppose all such steps, without waiting for particular direction from *England*. The *French* had at length nearly finished their chain of forts at the back of our colonies, and established an island communication between the mouth of the river *Mississippi* and the river *St. Lawrence*. Had they been let alone 'till they had finished the one, and established the other, and the affair been suffered to rest for a few years ; their
scheme

scheme of falling upon our colonies had been brought to maturity; and nothing would have remained, but upon some rupture to have put it into execution. But says the *Examiner* *, *it was not the danger of our colonies, but the encroachments on our rights which occasioned the war. Rights, which however remote or inconsiderable, it would not have suited the dignity of our crown tamely to have seen invaded; but no public act mentioned, and no private man of sense ever thought of danger.* These assertions are something extraordinary, and therefore I will bestow a few remarks upon them. The *French* encroached upon our rights, and when they had done that, they fortified themselves in their encroachments by building forts; and yet our colonies had no danger to apprehend either present or distant from such encroachments and forts—I say, no danger either present or distant, because *it was not danger that occasioned the war*, whereas was the *danger* ever so distant, still it would be *danger*. Thus it appears, that this bloody and expensive war was began merely to support the dignity of the crown. The rights invaded by the *French* were inconsiderable, and might have remained to them without any danger to our colonies. This is giving a poor account of the rise of the present war; and assigning but a bad reason for our shedding so much blood, and spending so much money. It gives us but a mean opinion of his late majesty and minis-

* Page 86, the note.

try, who could not devise how to secure the dignity of the crown, but by entering into a war for a mere punctilio ; surely they might have saved the dignity of the crown, by insisting upon the *French* king's making yearly a pepper corn acknowledgement, or paying some small consideration for his being left in the peaceable possession of his encroachments ; I doubt not, but that he would have made this satisfaction readily, and then the war had been prevented ; the successfulness of which was a matter of uncertainty when began. But *no publick act mentioned, and no private man of sense ever thought of danger.* That *no private man of sense ever thought of danger*, may be true enough, according to the *Examiner's* way of judging, which by his assertion appears to be, that if a person ever thought of danger, it was an evident proof of his being no man of sense : but, that he should assert *no public act mentioned danger*, is what I cannot account for better than by supposing, that either he or his employer was not arrived from *France*, when his late majesty issued out his declaration of war, that he did not see it while there, and that he has not consulted it since he hath had the opportunity, but if he will take the trouble of looking it over, he will meet with the following expressions in it, ‘ The unwarrantable proceedings
‘ of the *French* in the *West-Indies* and *North A-*
‘ *merica*, since the conclusion of the treaty of *Aix-*
‘ *la-Chapelle*, and the usurpations and encroach-
‘ ments made by them upon our territories, and
‘ the

‘ the settlements of our subjects in those parts,
 ‘ particularly in our province of *Nova Scotia*, have
 ‘ been so notorious and so frequent, that they can-
 ‘ not but be looked upon as a sufficient evidence
 ‘ of a formed design, and resolution in that court,
 ‘ to pursue invariably such measures as should most
 ‘ effectually promote their ambitious views, with-
 ‘ out any regard to the most solemn treaties and
 ‘ engagements.’ ‘ We contented ourselves with
 ‘ sending such a force to *America*, as was indispen-
 ‘ sably necessary for the immediate defence and
 ‘ protection of our subjects, against fresh attacks
 ‘ and insults ! In the mean time, great naval arma-
 ‘ ments were preparing in the ports of *France*, and
 ‘ a considerable body of *French* troops embarked
 ‘ for *North America* ;—and it appeared, that their
 ‘ real design was only to gain time for the passage
 ‘ of those troops to *America*, which they hoped
 ‘ would secure the superiority of the *French* forces
 ‘ in those parts, to enable them to carry their am-
 ‘ bitious and oppressive projects into execution.’
 Now tho’ the word *danger* does not occur in these
 passages, it may be fairly inferred from them, that
 the king and his ministry had it in their thoughts,
 that there was an ambitious and oppressive project
 to be put into execution in *America*, and that there
 was danger of its being executed, by the attempts
 made on the side of *France* to secure their superi-
 ority of their forces in those parts. But tho’ his
 late majesty and ministry thought our colonies in
 danger, and said as much in the declaration of war,
 yet

yet it's no reflection on them, to assert, that no *private* man of sense ever thought of danger, for they were all *public* and not *private* men. But even supposing that our colonies were of no danger of being conquered, either one or other of them, tho' the *French* had put their ambitious and oppressive projects into execution as far as they were capable, which may be the kind of danger the *Examiner* means, were they in no danger of suffering very considerably by the encroachments made upon them, and of being rendered much less useful to the mother country than otherwise? Now, were they in no danger of being subdued to the *French*, tho' these were left to prosecute their ambitious and oppressive projects; yet were they in danger of being rendered in a great measure useless to *England*, still they would be in such danger as to call for our providing for their security. But *security against any kind of danger* (say some) *might have been had in our recovered rights, and by confining the French within their proper limits, without our possessing all Canada.* No, by no means; for had *Canada* been reduced within its own bounds as assigned on our part, and had our claims been allowed of, this would have formed no barrier to our colonies against the *Canadians*; and tho', by erecting forts and fortifying passes, we should have gained some security, it would not have been *sufficient*, as the *French* would soon have been at their old practices, as there is no trusting to them, and as the nature and extent of the country, at the back of our colonies,

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lonies, would admit of their making fresh encroachments in different places without their being soon subject to a discovery. It is the *encroachers* more than the *encroachments* that have endangered our colonies; and the security these want, is, against the *cause* more than the *effect*: but the giving back the encroachments does not yield them that security: the *Canadians* are still left, tho' confined to narrower limits, which unless defended they will pass without hesitation; but the defence of such limits, in every part, will be too expensive. As to *France's* agreeing to certain boundaries, 'tis nothing, a mere *Gallica fides*; unless these are upon one account or other impassable. Without then the possession of *all Canada* with its inhabitants, our colonies could not have a *sufficient* security—I add with its inhabitants, as these increase the security by becoming *English* subjects, and as were these to remove to *Louisiana*, the danger would only be removed from the strongest to the weakest, from the *Northern* to the *Southern* colonies.

But now to shew you how far the possession of *Canada*, I mean with its inhabitants, secures our continental colonies. It does not secure them from all molestation by savages, but from all that molestation which the savages were stirred up to give them by the *French* in *Canada*; who have from time to time, without regarding their being at peace with us, excited the *Indians* to commit horrible ravages. The damage that these barbarians do, consists, not so much in the numbers they kill,

as in the persons, and in the depredations they occasion. The persons they fall upon are the back settlers, employed in extending the cultivation, and making improvements; but by the *Indian* hostilities these improvements are stopt, and the persons employed in making them are killed, or drove off their lands with the loss of all their past labour, cattle, &c. and thus the colonies, notwithstanding the largeness of their boundaries, are in some measure cramped. It is of no small consequence then for our colonies to be delivered from such hostilities; and this our northern colonies will be for 1000 miles and better, as all those *Indians* that dwell near the river *St. Lawrence*, or the four lakes, will depend so upon our present colonies or *Canada*, as to oblige them to a good behaviour. The possession of *Canada* will give security then against a number of *Indian* hostilities, and I know of no occasion to erect any other kind of forts than block-houses, for the traders to lodge their goods in with safety, and the defence of which may be left to such traders. It will moreover give security to our northern colonies from all hostile attacks from the *French* in *Canada*, as these will commence by such possession *English* subjects; and that our negotiators in 1761, intended to prevent a future rupture upon account of the limits of *Canada*, appears from the precaution they gave into, for the settling of such limits immediately. Indeed it does not give security to our southern colonies of the *Carolina's* and *Georgia*; but whoever looks upon a

map of *North America* may observe, that the limits insisted upon by our negotiators, secured to us not only all that lay on this side the *Ohio* 'till its confluence with the *Mississippi*, but a large tract of some hundred miles lying between the river *Ouabache* and the other side of the *Ohio*; and from the junction of these rivers to the *Mississippi* we were to possess all on this side. Thus the limits of *Canada* were to be fixed, and reached nearly as far to the southward as *North Carolina*. That our negotiators were not unobservant about the limits at the back of the *Carolina's* and *Georgia*, appears by their not allowing the limits of *Louisiana* delivered in a note by *M. de Buffy*. Whether if the negotiation had proceeded, the *French* and *English* would have settled these limits so clearly as to have admitted of no future disputes, I cannot ascertain; but if this had not been done, and the limits been carried far enough back, a door would have been left open for a new war, and the southern colonies would have been exposed to attacks from *Louisiana*. Our southern colonies are represented by the *Examiner*, as more valuable than the northern, because of the imports from the former being much larger than the imports from the latter. I have heard of persons notions lying heels upwards. This seems to be the case with the *Examiner's* notions of imports and exports; as tho' it was more to our advantage to be debtor than creditor, I would recommend it to him to study merchants accounts; but I am afraid that besides this he needs a little honesty, for tho' he

he has told us how superior the imports from the southern are, to the imports from the northern colonies, he has not mentioned a word of the superiority of the exports to the latter. The southern colonies are the weakest, but, whatever they may be when more peopled and better cultivated, they are not the most valuable. Being the weakest, and having powerful tribes of *Indians* at the back of them, it may be said, that care ought to have been taken for their security. We cannot say, how far it might or might not have been done, had the negotiation proceeded: indeed, it could not have been done so effectually, while the *French* remained in possession of the lands on this side the *Mississippi*, and it does not appear in the least from the historical memorial, that we once thought of asking or the *French* of giving up such lands. But tho' our southern colonies, the *Carolina's* and *Georgia*, (I leave out *Virginia* and *Maryland*, as these were taken care of by carrying the limits of *Canada* down to the confluence of the *Ohio* with the *Mississippi*, within 30 miles of the line that divides *Virginia* and *North Carolina*) are the weakest, it should be remembered that the *French* in *Louisiana* are proportionably weak; and if proper care is taken to prevent the inhabitants of *Canada* from removing into *Louisiana*, and to promote the population of these colonies, they will strengthen more in proportion than the *French* in *Louisiana*. Besides, our northern colonies having nothing further to fear, we may find in them resources of men
sufficient

sufficient to repel the *Louisianians* no ways equal in number to the *Canadians*; yea to act offensively against them, should it become necessary. The possession of *Canada* will not give absolute security to our continental colonies both northern and southern, but this, and fixing proper limits at the back of the *Carolina's* and *Georgia*, will give us all the security that the nature of affairs will admit of while *Louisiana* remains to *France*, and will put things upon such a footing, that, unless the *British* ministry should be weak, timid, or criminally negligent, it will be extremely dangerous for the *French* to commit fresh hostilities, or to make any more encroachments upon the *North American* continent, laying the foundation for another war: but had *Canada* however bounded remained to *France*, we had made a foolish bargain tho' we had retained *Guadaloupe*, and a peace would only have suspended our quarrel, instead of concluding it. Whatever hath been thrown out to lessen *Canada* as a colony, it is not so insignificant as pretended.

But to insist upon the advantages to be drawn from *Canada* as a colony. The *Examiner* says *, *Canada may be of some advantage to us. I must confess I do not know what that advantage is*; and yet in another place †, he tells us that, *by the late treaty we should have acquired Canada, worth annually 14,015 l. 17 s. 1 d.* But he will reconcile these different passages, by pleading that the expence of

* Page 95.

† Page 60.

keeping *Canada* will amount to 20,000 l. ‘ When-
 ‘ ever *Canada* becomes an *English* colony it must
 ‘ be defended by us.’ True; and yet by its be-
 ing so, we shall be at less expence than otherwise.
 We shall have to defend *Canada*, not from those
Indians that dwell at the back of our northern co-
 lonies, nor from those that lie west of *Canada* with
 whom the *Canadians* are in alliance, but from all
 the attacks that the *French* may make upon it in
 future times with a view of regaining it; which
 we may do with the very same shipping that are
 employed in covering the coasts of the other colo-
 nies. We must, considering that *Canada* is a con-
 quest, maintain garrisons in some of the capital
 places: but by its being an *English* colony, we
 shall be freed from the charge of maintaining a
 number of other garrisons on the frontiers of our
 other colonies, and thereby make a saving; for
 which reason the defence of *Canada* ought not to
 be set at any thing: would it be an additional
 charge to us, then the increase of such charge and
 no more should be placed to its account. But be-
 sides, whatever money our garrisons in *Canada* may
 cost us, it will circulate back again, either direct-
 ly or through our other colonies. As to the *Exa-*
miner’s account of the imports from *Canada*, from
Christmas 1760, to *Christmas* 1761, I question its
 genuineness. It has been averred in the public
 papers, that they amounted to 70,000 l. for the
 truth of which the person appealed to the import-
 ers. It was also observed, that no account had been
 taken

taken of the cargoes of the three *Canada* ships, which were taken and carried to *France*. These ships had cargoes to the amount of 30,000 l. value. Now I doubt not, but that the *Examiner* would have replied to these things could he have done it, with as great alertness, as he reprimanded the editor of one of the papers *, for inserting a note of his own, when giving an account of the *Examination*. If he hath replied to these things, I have not seen the reply. But whoever attends to his *Examination* may observe, that he had no design of giving us the real value of *Canada*. If he meant to acquaint us with it, he should have favoured us with an account of the imports from *Canada* to *France*, before the commencement of the war, e'er the *Indians* were taken off from hunting beaver and deer, and clapped upon the *English* colonist. Doubtless he could have procured it, with as much ease, as the original vouchers from the custom-house of Bourdeaux †, authenticating the account of *West-Indian* produce exported from thence. But what answered his end in one case, would have injured his cause in another. Whether this same writer was, as hath been publickly asserted, the author of remarks upon the letter to two great men, comes not within the compass of my present knowledge: but the *Remarker* attempts not to depreciate the trade of *Canada* in other words than these, ‘ the whole trade of furs and skins, which *Canada* carri-

* See the *London Chronicle* for Oct. 23, P. 397. † Page 20.

• ed on with *France*, fell short in its most flourish-
 • ing state of 140,000 l. a year.' This agrees
 tolerably well with what has been asserted of the
 imports, amounting the last year to 70,000 l. be-
 sides cargoes lost to the value of 30,000 l. making
 in the whole 100,000 l. We may set the yearly
 imports from *Canada*, upon an average, at 100,000 l.
 It cannot be estimated at less; for how can it be
 thought, that a colony of 40,000 inhabitants should
 be in any tolerable circumstances of ease without
 manufactures, unless it can send goods to this a-
 mount, to barter for those it wants from the mo-
 ther country. The *Remarker* tells us, ' the *French*
 • have been long since convinced that this province
 • (of *Canada*) was of use to them, independent of
 • their hopes of encroaching on our possessions. Ask
 • those, Sir, who lately saw *Canada*, if it had the face
 • of a colony which the mother country was weary
 • of holding? I believe, Sir, they will tell you,
 • that the cultivation of the lands, the number
 • and neatness of the houses, the warm condition
 • of the inhabitants, by no means seemed to im-
 • ply, that they were neglected by *France*; but
 • evinced, rather, that this colony was the object
 • of her very tender concern.' This is an acknow-
 ledgment of the flourishing state and good con-
 dition of *Canada*, and necessarily implies, that the
 imports from thence to *France* must be as consi-
 derable as what I have fixed them at, especially
 when it's considered, that as the *Remarker* says,
 • a very great part of the value of those furs (which

‘ it sends to *France*) is returned from *France* in the
 ‘ article of brandy, without which the trade with
 ‘ the *Indians* for their beaver and deer skins could
 ‘ not be carried on; and that the rest of their pro-
 ‘ duce, with regard to the market of *Europe*, is
 ‘ as nothing.’ Supposing the brandy returned is
 worth 20,000 l. there remains only 80,000 l. to
 supply 40,000 inhabitants (which is but forty shil-
 lings a head) and to make their situation as agree-
 able as can well be imagined. But says the *Exa-*
miner *, the inhabitants of *Pensylvania* do not take
 off much above the value of 20 s. a head. Very
 well, but then unhappily for him, he tells us †
 from *Douglas*, that they manufacture, perhaps nine
 parts in ten of all they wear; this is referred to the
 settlers, especially the back settlers: he adds, they
 ‘ make linen even for exportation.’ Now can any
 thing like this be said of the *Canadians*. I have
 further to observe, that the very quantity of skins
 and furs, manufactured, used, and disposed of by
 the *French*, before the war justifies my valuing
 the imports from *Canada* at not less than 100,000 l.
 This 100,000 l. will necessarily produce exports
 to the same value. But the imports from *Canada*
 are not valuable *only* as they produce exports in
 return. These imports consisting of furs, skins,
 &c. are of vast advantage to several of our manu-
 factures, and will secure to our country almost the
 whole of some particular branches of trade. It

* Page 107. † Page 80.

must be remembered also, that whatever advantage we have from *Canada* is lost to *France*. It is so much taken from her and added to us, which doubles the difference. Hitherto we have attended only to the skin and fur trade of *Canada*. I come now to remark, that by possessing *Canada* with the islands in the gulph of *St. Lawrence*, we increase the dependance of the *French West-Indies* upon our colonies, and secure to ourselves the advantages that *Canada* had by trading with them. The *French* had no other northern colony, from whence to supply their islands with lumber, corn, and provision. These are articles absolutely necessary for them; and they must have them either from *Canada* or our other colonies; whatever then they expended in these with the *Canadians*, will be gained to us, either in our colony of *Canada*, or the adjacent ones: not only so, but by keeping *Canada*, we put it out of the power of *France* to raise this colony to such a flourishing state, as to ruin that extensive trade, that our continental colonies carry on with the *French West-Indies* for lumber, provision, &c. which it would soon have done, when once it could have answered the demand of the *French West-Indies* for these particulars. The *French* would have prohibited their planters trading with our colonies, when once they could have been supplied from *Canada*: and the *French* would have been wanting to their own interests, if they had not laboured to bring that colony into a situation admitting of it. As the cession of *Canada* will se-

cure the peaceable possession of our northern colonies, so of their extensive trade to the *French* islands, which tho' most profitable to the colonies is extremely profitable to the mother country. What hath been mentioned, I hope will shew, that *Canada* as a colony, will be of no small importance ; and yet, I have other things to add greatly in its favour. It is an improveable estate, which if properly managed will turn to a most excellent account. Nothing but the most consummate ignorance or impudence, could have led the *Examiner* to say, that *Canada* * *proper lies in a climate absolutely incapable of furnishing any one of the commodities*, that the advocates for keeping it, *pretend to raise*. The northernmost boundary lying upon the river *St. Lawrence* in 49° latitude, is more to the southward than any part of *Great Britain*, or than those *Russian* dominions from which we are supplied with hemp ; and therefore may in time furnish with this commodity ; and if *this commodity in our old settlements, in climates full as favourable to its growth, never has hitherto been cultivated to any advantage, but has even resisted parliamentary encouragements and bounties, almost equal to its native value* †, it has been owing to the colonist's being able to make better of his lands by employing them in agriculture, tobacco, or the like, or to there not being sufficient hands, or to the junction of both these causes. As to the advantage, that our old

* Page 81. † Page 77.

settlements have, by being situated near the sea, it is not *infinitely* superior to what the *Canadians* enjoy from the river *St. Lawrence*, and others that empty themselves into it. From the northernmost boundary of *Canada* on this river up to *Montreal* it is 360 miles; and whoever examines *Mitchell's* map of *North America*, will find, that there are a number of fine rivers between these two extremities, which appear free from falls and flats, and capable of admitting of an inland navigation for many miles up the country. I will allow with the *Examiner*, that, making the boundary of our colonies to run along the river *St. Lawrence*, from thence all along to the southward of the lakes, and so down the river *St. Jerome* or *Ouabache*, we have, independent of *Canada* proper, land more than sufficient for every sort of product, which the most sanguine schemist can imagine*. But he must be a most extraordinary schemist indeed, who could suppose, that these lands, which border upon *Canada*, would be improved to any purpose, while that remained to the *French*; or that we had hands enow to improve them properly. Would any number of people have ventured to settle on the eastern side of *St. Lawrence*, at a great distance from the most populous parts of our colonies, with a view of raising hemp, while the *French* possessed the other side of it? Or would they have done it, 'till the whole sea coast had been settled? But this is not yet set-

* Page 81.

tled,

tled; in *Nova Scotia*, neither will be for many years to come. We wanted not only security for our colonies, but inhabitants to make further improvements; and both these we have by keeping *Canada*. The *Canadians* have not only the western side of the river *St. Lawrence*, but the eastern (now that they are become *English* subjects) down to the northernmost part of *Nova Scotia*, to favour the raising of hemp, and opening a trade with us for any other enumerated commodities; and necessity, together with parliamentary encouragement, will put them in a few years upon procuring such commodities. Our other colonies upon the sea coast, by reason of their superior advantages, will shut out *Canada* from having any great share in the trade to the *West-Indies* or any other place, where their articles of commerce are the same. The *Canadians* must therefore apply themselves to those branches of trade, in which our other colonies will not interfere with them, such as naval stores, pitch, tar, turpentine, iron, copper ore, hemp, and oil. They may trade in these without danger of rivalry; and if encouraged by parliament for a while, will soon find their account in doing it. But a small part of their country will be improved without they do it, as a small part will grow all the corn wanted for their support, and by reason of their situation, they cannot supply distant markets with provision articles, upon the same easy terms with our other colonies. They have no choice; either they must apply themselves to these branches, or their whole trade

trade must be confined to skins and furs, and the greatest part of *Canada* be of no advantage to them. I have allowed, that, without *Canada* reduced within the bounds mentioned by the *Examiner*, we have land more than sufficient for every sort of product; but then, a great part of this land must have remained an uncultivated tract, so long as *France* was possessed of what he styles *Canada* proper. The lands of *Nova Scotia*, and *New England*, for 480 miles from the gulph of *St. Lawrence* to *Montreal*, would necessarily have been encroached, because of their being in a bad neighbourhood. The same objection would have prevailed against the *New York* lands from *Montreal* to lake *Ontario* for 160 miles. The back parts of *Pensylvania*, and the lands on the *Ohio*, lie far from the coasts and beyond the mountains, and therefore according to the *Examiner*, can be of no great service; who, after arguing the point for some time *, comes to this conclusion, *that inland colonies can never prove in any considerable degree beneficial to our commerce* †. This conclusion I cannot assent to; for, let inland colonies be at a considerable distance from the coast, yet by the help of water-carriage they may prove extremely beneficial to commerce. And thus would it be with a colony on the banks of the *Ohio*, for this river by reason of its gentle current is navigable either up or down, from its source to its influx, with only one fall near its conflux, with the

* Page 78, 79. † Page 81.

Ouabache, and from the *Mohongalo* that empties itself into the *Ohio* to *Wills's Creek* on the north branch of the *Potowmack* it is but sixty miles, so that a communication may be established between the banks of the *Ohio* and the sea-coasts of *Virginia*, without its being attended with such a length of land-carriage, as to render it unserviceable, and of this the *Ohio* company was sensible, when they obtained their charter in 1749. A considerable advantage may be made of an inland colony on the banks of the *Ohio*, if such can be established, notwithstanding all that the *Examiner* talks of
 ‘ ascending the streams that fall from the western
 ‘ side of the mountains, of descending those that
 ‘ fall from the eastern, of rifts and falls, of often
 ‘ unloading and reloading,’ by means of which, he cunningly aggravates difficulties, ’till his reader believes them to be insurmountable. We may now people that rich, flat, fertile country, through which the *Ohio* winds its gentle course, and make it subservient to our commerce : we may do it safely, as *Canada* remains to *England*, and the settlers will have nothing to fear from the *Canadians*. It may possibly be said, that *Canada* proper lies at a great distance from the lands upon the *Ohio* ; but the first article of the answer of *England* to the *ultimatum* of *France*, acknowledges the contrary, when it says, ‘ *Canada* comprehending, agreeable
 ‘ to the line of limits drawn by *M. de Vaudreuil*
 ‘ himself, when he gave up the province by capitulation, on one side the lakes *Iburon*, *Michigon*,
 ‘ and

and *Superior*; and the said line, drawn from lake *Rouge*, comprehending by a winding course the river *Ouabache* to its junction with the *Ohio*, and from thence stretching along this last river inclusively to its confluence with the *Mississippi*.' This article is so darkly expressed, that it is scarce to be known from it, whether this line of limits is the boundary of *Canada* to the east or west; if to the west, it carries in it an acknowledgment that the lands on this side the *Ouabache* towards the *Ohio* were a part of *Canada*; if to the east, then the western boundary should have been specified: but I take it to be the western. By this time the reader will begin to think that I have forgotten the point in hand, and yet I trust he will allow the contrary, when I have observed, that, whatever improvements may now be made of our recovered rights which could not have been made had *Canada* remained to the *French*, shews the importance of *Canada* as an *English* colony. And now what little occasion is there for decrying *Canada* under the notion of a vast but unprofitable forest, extensive but unprofitable empire. Should we reckon to *Canada* the islands in the gulph of *St. Lawrence*, then we must put into the account all the disadvantages and losses that the *French* fishery sustains through their not having these islands.

But to insist upon *GUADALOUPE*. That the exports and imports to and from this island, was it to remain to us, would for several years exceed our trade with *Canada* cannot be doubted. But the

value of a trade is not to be estimated merely by the cost of the commodities exchanged in it. Should the commodities exported from one place cost double the commodities from another, yet if these last are of double advantage to our manufactures, then the only superiority on either side lies in the greater quantity of shipping that is employed. The imports from *Guadaloupe* may be divided into eatables and raw materials to be wrought up in our manufactures. The value of the latter, amounts to better than 100,000 l. the sum at which I have fixed the imports from *Canada*: but then it must be observed, that *Canada* will admit of much greater improvements than *Guadaloupe*, and may in time furnish us with materials amounting to more than the whole imports from the latter; the far greatest part of which consist of eatables. If these are consumed at home, it will be in consequence of their growing cheaper than at present; but if they cheapen, the value of the imports will necessarily be sunk. If they are exported; and our balance to other states is proportionably diminished, they will certainly be of great advantage to us. But if instead of paying our debts, they serve only to bring in needless and luxurious articles, they will even prove a detriment to us; notwithstanding the advantages gained by carrying them to and fro, factorage and the like; for it will be much the same as tho' they had been imported from *France* and paid for by our cash, 'till the planter has lost all his affection for his mother country,

and

and inclines to spend his fortunes in *Great Britain*: the only difference will be our furnishing the planter with the exports. We import from *Guadaloupe* sugars to the amount of 400,000 l. we look upon the whole as clear gain, and instead of applying it towards paying off where the balance is against us, we export it in return for useless and unprofitable articles, which increase not the real stock of the nation, and which we should otherwise have done without: we pay the planter the 400,000 l. as we cannot send him the cash, he comes over and receives it, transforms it into bullion or its equivalent, carries it over to *France*, for which he hath a natural affection, and there spends it. Thus would it be with the planter or planters for a generation at least, was *Guadaloupe* to remain to *Great Britain*; 'till a new race, and a long intercourse with *Britain* had obliterated the thoughts of their original extraction. Hence we may gather the weakness of the *Examiner's* assertion in the close of the following paragraph *, *The French inhabitants of Guadaloupe have most certainly at this day in their possession more gold in specie, than is to be found in all our other Leeward islands put together. The far greater part of this treasure must, immediately upon a peace, of necessity in one tide flow in upon that country which shall then be master of Guadaloupe. Did Guadaloupe remain to Great Britain, the balance of trade would be so much in favour of the former,*

* Page 54, note at bottom.

that she would not want to expend any of this treasure for our commodities ; for if the imports from thence amount to 600,000 l. and the exports, with the negroes included, to less than 250,000 l. there remains 350,000 l. for her to spend,, before she will want to touch this treasure. And the *French* inhabitants of *Guadaloupe* would never come and spend it in *England* ; no, but would retire to *France* with it. In like manner would they do with regard to the balance they might receive in the way of trade, tho' they might be obliged to come first to *England* for such balance. This seems to have been wholly overlooked by the Advocates for *Guadaloupe*, who have thought that there would be no difference between our own *West Indian* planters and the *French*, when once the latter were become *English* subjects, as tho' this would, to all intents and purposes, make them *Englishmen*. The *Examiner* tells us *, that the produce of *Guadaloupe* amounted from *Christmas* 1760, to *Christmas* 1761, to 603,269 l. 3s. 9d. and sets † the exports, including the purchase of negroes, at 238,569 l. 5s. 10d. and endeavours to persuade his reader, that was it to remain to us, there would be a considerable increase in both the imports and exports. But though the imports amounted to more than 600,000 l. the produce might be much less. In order to have known the produce of *Guadaloupe*, we should have been in-

* Page 42. † P. 52.

formed what were the annual imports upon an average from thence to *France* before the commencement of the war. The imports of 1761 might be increased by a stock in hand, which had not been disposed of the preceding year, from an apprehension that the *English* market would not prove a good one *, and by the *French* Prize goods purchased by the inhabitants; for the *Examiner* acquaints us †, tho' with quite different views, *that* *Guadaloupe* *has been the market for all the French prize goods taken in the West Indies.* As to negroes, its a question whether *Guadaloupe* would have continued taking off 4000 a year; the *Examiner* owns ‡, *that scarce any part of it is fully slaved;* which might be the reason of its purchasing so many this year; the planter might also be inclined to buy the more freely, from the imagination of his returning soon under the dominion of his former sovereign; and then being unable to purchase upon terms equally advantageous. As to the improvements that might be made of *Guadaloupe* in future years, it is at present a matter of speculation, and not of fact, and the *Examiner* hath in divers places discovered his dislike to speculations. In his account of *Guadaloupe* he also takes notice, *that the two ports of Glasgow and Leith in Scotland have carried on a considerable trade with this island, and that a great number of ships, and some very valuable ones, have been taken*

* This thought is confirmed by the low state of its trade immediately after its reduction in 1759. † P. 51. ‡ P. 48.

by the enemy, coming from Guadaloupe to England, which ought to be taken into the account. Here I am put upon asking, whether in the exports and imports to and from *North America*, those of *Scotland* were included? And whether the many ships, and some very valuable ones, taken by the enemy, going to or fro, ought not also to be taken account of? But when the advocates for *Guadaloupe* have said all, what has been observed concerning the imports from thence, if exported for uselefs articles, and the planters going to *France* with the balance, will hold good; so that it's egregious folly to talk of its being *an acquisition worth at this moment above 600,000 l. a year to our direct British trade* *; as tho' there was no difference between the trade between *Britain* and *Guadaloupe's* amounting to better than 600,000 l. a year, and being worth as much to the *British* trade. Such persons, instead of reckoning the *profits* of the trade, make the *whole trade profit*. The cotton of *Guadaloupe* is doubtless an important article, but there's no call for keeping the island for want of territory suited to the growth of this commodity, of which I shall make mention elsewhere. Thus I have delivered my thoughts upon *TRADE* in general, our *WEST-INDIAN* in particular, our *CONTINENTAL COLONIES*, *CANADA*, and *GUADALOUPE*, and hope, that in doing it, I have vindicated the conduct of the honourable persons employed in the negotiation of

* P. 102, 67, 68, 69.

1761, and shewn, that they knew what they were about better than the author of the Examination of it did, when he engaged in that service. The *Examiner*, sensible of the injury offered those honourable persons, apologizes for them after a most extraordinary manner, so as to increase his crime; for when his reader hath finished the apology, he is brought to think, either that such honourable persons were ignorant of the true interest of the publick, had their attention turned off from it by the cry about *Canada*, and our continental colonies, or to humour such cry and please the publick, knowingly sacrificed their true interest. The apology is more reproachful than the insult that occasioned it. There are several other things in the *Examination* that might be remarked upon, but I am tired with the performance; however, let me make a few quotations from it, which I am at a loss to reconcile with each other. They are these, *the late negotiation, so far as it regarded our colonies and commerce, was on our side conducted, I apprehend, on one single idea, viz. to secure to ourselves the possession of all Canada**. The reader will not entertain any doubt, that the treaty was conducted on a principle wholly averse to West-Indian acquisition †. A preference and a rejection, which could by no possibility have arisen from any other source, than the maxim which appears to have then governed our councils, viz. that the West-Indies were a part of the world in which we ought to aspire at nothing.

* P. 8. † P. 9.

The stamp of this maxim is impressed on every part of the treaty *. The resolution, however it came to prevail, that we ought not to extend our trade, or our empire in the West-Indies †. This very groundless opinion (concerning Canada and our continental colonies) was the true source of our neglect, in the late negotiation, of such real commercial advantages, as might augment the resources of Great Britain ‡. The curious reader will possibly be desirous of knowing who the *Examiner* is; I must own myself wholly incapable of giving him the proper information; but if I was to conjecture should imagine, either he or his employer is personally interested in *Guadaloupe's* remaining to *England*, and is better acquainted with the trade of that island than of our own.

I would now congratulate my country upon the preliminaries of peace, was it not unfashionable, and would it not make me suspected of favouring the present ministry, after having been employed in defending our great Commoner, and of being a *Scot* under covert. However, to shew that I am a true *Englishman*, and am not afraid of speaking my mind, I heartily congratulate them upon this occasion, and to justify myself in this singularity, I will assign some reasons for it.

When I look back to the year 1757, and consider what was then our situation, I am amazed and thankful, that our dominions will at a peace be so enlarged and secured, and such a wide door

* Page 11. † Page 13. ‡ Page 69.

we had reason to fear that both would be greatly contracted. Yea, all ranks of people were so dispirited and terrified, that they could scarce sleep soundly in their beds, for fear of invasions, and would have been ready to have agreed with our enemy upon any terms, so that they could have secured their lives and liberties. What are the present preliminaries, compared with what they must have been, had our affairs been as badly conducted throughout, as at the beginning of the war, before our great Commoner was employed, and proved the means of recovering *us* out of our fright, and *our affairs* out of their woful condition.

It is with national success as with the sun, each hath its meridian; whether ours had reached it no one knows; but had the war continued, and the event shewn that it had passed it, the uneven spirits of the nation had been sunk, and we should have been glad of a peace upon much better terms for the enemy. A considerable miscarriage or two would have frightened us almost into despondency, and we should have dreaded one misfortune upon the back of another. Such is the temper of our country. When I consider this, I am rejoiced, that we shall get out of the war with so much honour and advantage.

Had we refused making peace upon the present terms, and our enemies submitting to any worse, the war must have continued: but a peace on these terms is better than to have run the hazard of another campaign. We have every year expected,

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that

that the *French*, by the great superiority of their numbers, would prevail against the army of the allies, tho' commanded by one of the ablest generals of the age: and have been surprized at finding that they have been baffled. Would it have been surprising then, if at length they had carried their point! I will venture to say, that very few would have wondered at it, while almost all had wondered, that they had not carried it before. Had our affairs required it, we could have had little or no assistance from *Prussia*; he would either have had full employ for his troops in opposing the *Austrians*; or would have lost no opportunity of giving them a home thrust when he had got them at an advantage, in order to have helped us, when there was no more subsidy treaty existing, and we had so much in hand with which to make restitution. Would it not have been too great a venture to have refused agreeing to the present terms, and to have prosecuted the war, when attended in different places with so much uncertainty, even the improbability of success: I say, different places, with a view to *Portugal*. The *Spaniards*, humanly speaking, must have made themselves masters of it, in another campaign. And however some may talk, we must have parted with more or less of our conquests to have redeemed it. It is really diverting to hear it said, that had the *Spaniards* conquered and retained *Portugal*, we should have been gainers by it, as we should have had a direct trade to *Brasil*. It is not only *likely* and *highly probable* then,

then, but *certain*, that the king of *Portugal* would have continued his friendship for us, and have favoured us with a trade to the *Brasils*, though we had refused giving back some of our conquests to the common enemy, in order to recover his kingdom. *Risum teneatis amici!* Would he not rather, finding what an ungenerous ally he had to do with, have made a friend of *France*, by promising her the whole woollen trade, have given up all regards for our interest, and have extricated himself out of the war as well as possible. The importance of *Portugal*, and our trade with her, is well known to the manufacturers, and may be perceived by all that can recollect, how the Ports prevailed among us before and at the beginning of the war, 'till sent to *Germany*, melted down and coined into guineas. They that will sacrifice nothing for the benefit of allies, will never have allies that are worth any thing: and to think, that, because we are an island, we have no concern with the affairs of the continent, is to forget that we trade with the continent, and is to claim that independency that is inconsistent with the present system of the universe. How should we have blamed ourselves, had a change in our affairs, or those of our allies, reduced us to the disagreeable necessity of complying in 1763, with what we have not complied with in 1762. To adapt my language to the ideas of too numerous a part of the community, I hug myself, that we are got from the table with so much booty, e'er a run of ill luck had taken place.

We shall retain in our hands, more than we should have done, had we made peace upon our own terms the preceding year. Besides, the proposed acquisitions of that year, we shall have an immense tract of country lying between the lakes *Superior* and *Michigan*, the river *Ouabache* to its junction with the *Ohio*, and the *Ohio* from thence to the *Mississippi* on the one side, and the head of the *Mississippi* to its forks on the other. This tract contains many thousand square miles, and runs from *North* to *South* near as low as *North Carolina*. We have the free navigation of the river *Mississippi*, so that this tract might be made useful to us, could we tell how to people it. But the navigation of the *Mississippi* is of the greatest importance, as it opens an easy communication with the *Ouabache*, the *Ohio*, and the *Hogobeggee* or *Cherokees*, whereby all the objections made against improving the lands adjoining to one or other of these rivers, by reason of their lying beyond the mountains, and so far back from the coast, are removed. The lands of the *Ohio* will be greatly increased in value by means of this inland navigation down to the gulph of *Mexico*. We are farther to have all that the *French* claimed or possessed to the east of the *Mississippi* at the back of the *Carolina's* and *Georgia*, excepting the town of *New Orleans*, and the island in which it is situated, containing a prodigious large tract of country, though not equal to that beforementioned, but likely to be much more useful, by reason of its

its being more to the southward, lying nearer to the sea, and for three hundred miles bordering upon it. In the southernmost part of this tract, we have that continental land, I doubt not, which will admit of and favour the growth of the sugar cane. Because sugars are grown chiefly between the tropics, some from thence weakly conclude, that they will grow no where else: but experience shews us, that the same article will grow in very different climates, and why should it not be so with regard to sugars; yea, we have been told, that the inhabitants of *Louisiana* have actually raised this commodity; should inquiry shew this report to be false, it is certainly incumbent upon us to make the trial, and we are encouraged to do it from hence, that the southernmost part of the *Louisianian* tract ceded to us, is not so far from the *French* quarter of *St. Domingo*, as *Surinam*. But should it be found after trial, that the sugar cane cannot be cultivated in these parts to an advantage, what should hinder its being cultivated in the southernmost part of *Florida*, about eight degrees more to the *North* than *Jamaica*? If cotton can grow where sugar does, as in *Guadaloupe*, why cannot sugar grow where cotton does? Cotton, we are informed by geographers, grows wild in *Florida*. But all this time I have not observed, that by the present peace we are to have all *Florida* about three hundred miles long, and upon an average one hundred broad, so that we have the whole *North American* coast for our own, and the whole country as far

far back as to the *Mississippi*. We are also to retain the islands of *Grenada* and the *Grenadines*, and are to have three, instead of two, of the neutral islands. It may be said, that the *French* are to have the isle of *Miquelon* on the coast of *Newfoundland*, which was not allowed them by the last treaty. Very true; but this island the *French* deemed of so little importance, that they tell us in the historical memorial of the negotiation, that the Duke *de Choiseul* declared it should not be insisted upon. However, I wish it had not been granted, as I am for giving *France* nothing by way of complaisance, for fear she should retaliate as the viper in the fable. With regard to *St. Lucia*, which is to be restored to *France*, it does not appear, but that would have been consented to the last year. As to *Goree*, it was refused by the former negotiation, and some other expedient was to be thought of. Every one must see, that by the present treaty, we are to hold much more than we should have gained by that of the preceding year. 'Tis a matter of fact then, that by the present preliminaries we are better off, than we should have been had we made peace the last year upon our own terms, even though it should be thought that these preliminaries are not adequate to our successes. It may be objected, that we have been loaded with the expence of millions in consequence of the war's having been continued and enlarged. This necessarily followed, from our standing upon higher terms than *France* would agree to, and our refusing to comply with the unjustifiable demands

demands of *Spain*. But are the expences only on our side, have not both the *French* and *Spaniards* had their expences, and have not the captures made upon the last paid us well for the extraordinary charge they have put us to. We have got considerably from them, to the amount of millions in goods, shipping and cash; not only so, but we have obliged them to give up their claim to the *Newfoundland* fishery, to allow us the free and unmolested liberty of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood, and to cede us *Florida*.

I should have been very well pleased, could we have kept the *Havanna*, *Goree*, *Martinico*, *Guadeloupe*, and *St. Lucia*, all or any of them: but I am not displeased though we restore them, when I recollect how much we secure to ourselves. We have never been noted for making a good peace, for these many years; it has been usually the case, that our interests have been sacrificed to the benefit of our allies. It must be some satisfaction therefore to considerate persons, that we have improved in the arts of negotiation, though it should not appear that we are as yet adepts. It must be acknowledged by all, that our negotiators have taken ample care to prevent all future quarrels between us, the *French*, and *Spaniards*, with regard to limits on the continent; and that they have settled the affair of the logwood trade; but I cannot find in the preliminaries a word about the *Spaniards* examining or not, with their guarda costas, our trading ships as they pass and repass in the *American* seas; this
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point ought to be the more carefully settled, as we shall navigate those seas more than ever, by reason of our possessing all on this side the *Mississippi*. I hope, the ministry will give it proper attention before the definitive treaty is concluded. There is also no mention made of the ships taken from *France* before the declaration of war. The honour of the nation requires, that this matter should be so settled, as that *France's* commencing hostilities in *America* should warrant our commencing hostilities in *Europe*. Care hath been taken to demolish the family compact by the twenty-third article, which renews former treaties inconsistent with it.

But to make a few remarks, with respect to the places to be restored. One would be apt to suppose, from what some say of the *Havanna*, that had this remained to us, it would have been an amazing fund of wealth to our nation. So far from it, that unless we had applied ourselves to the cultivation of the country, it would no more have paid the expence of keeping, than *Minorca*. The intercourse between *that*, *Cartagena*, *Puerto Bello*, and *Vera Cruz* had been at an end. The galleons had no longer made it the place of rendezvous, and then it had been soon impoverished. If we had retained the *Havanna*, we should not have been allowed to have traded with the *Spanish West-Indies*, and so should have missed of our imaginary gains. Unless with the harbour we could have had the trade with the other dominions of *Spain* in those seas, we should have done the *Spaniard* a considerable damage

mage by keeping it, without doing ourselves any good. The main and almost only benefit it could be of to us, would be in war-time, as it would prove an excellent harbour for our shipping, and in case of a rupture with *Spain* would endanger their galleons. But what! is there no place either on the eastern or western coast of *Florida*, or on the coast that runs from *Florida* to the *Mississippi*, where we might make a harbour? Is there no bay from *St. Augustin* all round *Florida* to the island of *New Orleans*, an extent of nine hundred miles, where we might have a safe port for our ships to run into, careen and repair? The bay of *Mobile* and the bay of *Pensacola* make a fine appearance in the map, and if they have a good entrance and proper depth of water will afford our shipping all the shelter wanted, and by lying in the gulf of *Mexico* will, in case of a fresh rupture with *Spain*, favour our views upon the galleons. I cannot but think, that, within that length of 300 miles of coast on the gulf of *Mexico* that *France* cedes to us, we may find a convenient spot where to erect docks, and yards, for the service of our navy in those parts, and that may supply the place of the *Havanna*. This at least ought to be examined into. As to the *Havanna*, while it would be of no great advantage to us in a time of peace, it would be of such detriment to the *Spaniards*, that they would scarce have consented to any peace but upon condition of its being restored; and tho' *Florida* is not an equivalent to them, it may be

made almost of as much, if not of more consequence to the *English*. Besides, by restoring the *Havanna*, we settle the dispute about the fishery and logwood trade, and recover to our ally of *Portugal* the places that *Spain* hath taken from him.

Goree hath been represented as necessary to the security of *Senegal*, and it hath been argued, that for this reason, it should have been retained; and yet, *Senegal* was taken *May* 1, 1758, and *Goree* not 'till *December* 29, two different expeditions were set on foot against them at distant periods, and the mouth of the river *Sanaga* is full a hundred miles to the northward of *Goree*. Can it be thought, that the last is necessary to the security of *Senegal*, or can afford such security, when it lies at such a distance from it, and when we were not obliged to reduce that, e'er we had taken the other, instead of, before we attacked the other! They that will believe against inferences fairly deducted from facts, are too far gone to be argued with*.

That we should have kept *Martinico*, *Guadaloupe*, and *St. Lucia*, is not argued for, except by those that are for keeping all that we have conquered. But many think, that we should have retained either *Guadaloupe* or *St. Lucia*, or both. And what, and if the *French* would not have consented to it, and we had been obliged to have pro-

* I say nothing of the importance of *Senegal*, as the vigorous endeavours of our merchants to prevent the monopoly of its trade are an indisputable proof of it.

longed the war, and our affairs had taken a new and unhappy turn! This is not thought of. We have been so used for years to success, that it does not once enter our minds that we may possibly meet with rebuffs. But what is thought of, is the advantage that we might reap from the possession of *Guadaloupe* and *St. Lucia*. The latter may have a fine harbour, and may therefore seem necessary; but we have in *Granada* one, if not equally fine, as fine * as is wanted; and it's certain, that tho' we have wanted the harbour of *St. Lucia*, we have done without it hitherto. The want of such a one may have subjected us to some difficulties, but still we have done very well notwithstanding; and nothing can be a better proof, of its not being so very necessary as what some would insinuate. Tho' we have not had this port to repair to in the hurricane season, I do not recollect that we have lost a single ship in consequence thereof, the whole war. *Guadaloupe* would have without doubt been of great use to us; and yet not of such use as the advocates for keeping it pretend; this hath been shown above under the article of *Guadaloupe*. With

* The principal port, called *Lewis*, stands in the middle of a large bay on the west side of the island, which has a sandy bottom, where a thousand barks from three to four hundred tons may ride safe from storms, and the harbour will hold a hundred ships of a thousand tons moored. By reason of a sand bank great ships are obliged to pass within 80 paces of one of the two little mountains which are at the mouth of the harbour, and half a mile or thereabouts asunder.

regard to cotton, the main particular in which for the present it would have been useful to us, I have observed that it grows wild in *Florida*. Now there is no proportion between *Florida* and *Guadeloupe* as to size, the former being so much larger than the latter. We may argue from the cottons growing wild in *Florida* that the soil is natural to it, and that of course it may be easily cultivated, and will pay well for the trouble. Why then should we desire to retain *Guadeloupe* for the sake of its cotton! Rather let us promote the settling of *Florida*. The ensuing peace will cut off the means of support from thousands—thousands that have been employed in fighting our battles for us. Let our acquisitions be peopled with colonies out of this body of brave men. Let every encouragement be given to those of them that are married, or that will marry, and go to settle abroad. And what can be a more suitable *place* than *Florida*, or *employ* than the cultivation of cotton. When once the ground is cleared, they will have little difficulty in cultivating it, the soil being natural to it. They may sow and gather it themselves; and a number of children would in a few years, instead of being a burden to them, be of considerable service. They might cultivate this commodity, notwithstanding the lowness of their circumstances, and be soon able to maintain themselves without any further help from the government than protection. But I must not overlook the addition of sugar land, that we should have gained by retaining

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ing *Guadeloupe* and *St. Lucia*; and that more sugar land is wanted than what our former *West-Indian* islands contained, I am ready to allow. I have mentioned the necessity of continental land capable of producing sugars, and have specified where I apprehend we have that land; I would now observe, that by the present preliminaries we increase our insular sugar land in the *West-Indies* considerably.

Notwithstanding our claim upon the neutral islands, the *French* were in possession of them; whereas now we shall have three out of four in our own hands. Before we had only our title to them, which was disputed; but now, by entering upon them, there is an actual addition of so much to our *West-Indian* territory. This addition is not trifling. *Dominica* is about 32 miles in length and 12 in breadth. *Tobago* is about 36 miles in length, 12 in breadth, and 90 in circumference. *St. Vincent* is still larger, by the acknowledgment of the *Examiner* *. Either of these islands is bigger than *St. Lucia*. In time of peace, the situation of these islands will be of no disadvantage to them; and in time of war, that which protects our other islands from being conquered, will suffice to protect them, notwithstanding the neighbourhood of the *French* islands, viz. the superiority of our navy. But besides having the actual possession of the above neutral islands, we are to

* Page 63.

have *Grenada* about 75 miles in circumference, together with the adjacent small islands called the *Grenadines*; and in *Grenada*, as hath been above observed, we shall have a most excellent harbour. It may be feared, that by making the restitutions we have agreed to, and by suffering the *French* to have a share in the fishery, we have left it in their power to begin a fresh war with us after a few years; and that we shall soon see them in as flourishing a condition as ever. Though they are not excluded from the fishery, yet their liberty of fishing, compared with what it was before the war, is so curtailed, that they must suffer a considerable prejudice. Surely there is a vast difference between their having *Cape Breton*, and all the other islands in the gulf of *St. Lawrence*, on which to cure their fish caught upon their coasts, and their not being allowed ‘ to exercise the fishery but at
‘ the distance of three leagues from all the coasts
‘ belonging to *Great Britain*, as well those of the
‘ continent, as those of the islands in the gulf;
‘ and out of the gulf, but at the distance of fifteen leagues from the coasts of the island of *Cape Breton*.’ Those restrictions will be preventive of their carrying on so extensive a fishery as formerly; and the possession of *Cape Breton* and the other islands, with security upon all the coasts of *Nova Scotia*, will give us such advantages in the fishery, that it will be our own fault if we do not exclude the *French* from a great part of the foreign trade for fish. That *France* will commence a
new

new quarrel with us, whenever she can hope to gain by it, I do not in the least question ; and had we retained all that we have taken, this would not have prevented it. If the situation of our own affairs, had warranted her expecting to make an advantage by breaking with us, she would have done it, tho' she had not been fully recovered of the wounds received in the present war : but when fully recovered of them, she will not dare to do it unless our own circumstances give the temptation. Let there be a thorough good understanding between the several parts of the legislature, and unanimity among our great men, spreading its balmy influence through the lower ranks of the body politick, to the preventing or healing of their divisions. Let our ministry be spirited, refusing to be the dupes of foreign princes, and discovering a determined resolution properly to resent, not only real injuries, but meer indignities offered solely with the view of trying their courage. Let individuals move in their own sphere, and each observe to keep the station he is posted in by his birth, rank, and character. Let principles of œconomy be adopted, government sine-cures be annihilated, expensive perquisites be reduced, luxuriant pensions (given for vote and interest, and not the rewards of real merit) undergo a good lopping, and the extravagant profits of places be brought within due bounds. Let us not live up to the income of our common estate, but remember how deeply the same is mortgaged, and ap-
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ply ourselves to the lessening the incumbrance, that posterity may think of us with gratitude, and revere our memories. Let us attend to the improving our new acquired or recovered territories, by planting colonies and enlarging our trade, that so the superfluous hands thrown in upon the nation by the peace, whether sailors or soldiers, may neither starve, beg, steal, or quit an ungrateful *christian* country (which after having served its turn *by* them, hath no further concern *about* them) to enter into foreign service. In doing this, let us observe, to make a settlement one or more upon the banks of the *Mississippi*, and to enter as soon as possible upon the actual navigation of it, that it may appear we meant not to stipulate for rights which we intended to make no use of, and that future periods may produce no litigations by our suffering them to lie dormant. Let us also for the future maintain in peaceable times a more powerful navy than we have been used to do, that so we may not hazard being fatally surprized, as we had like to have been, when the present broil commenced.

Should this advice be followed, the *French*, let them recruit their lost strength ever so fast, will not dare to strike us, finding us ready, both in mind and body, to return the blow. But if, on the other hand, the artful practices of enemies, or the ungovernable passions of friends, sow dissension between the king and parliament, the jarring interests of different nobles and persons of quality

lity hamper the administration ; the important concerns of the public are neglected, amidst the bustling endeavours of the *Ins*, to secure their places ; and of the *Outs*, to supplant them ; the nation is divided into parties by the disputes of the great ; the savings, that ought to be made out of the revenue, are divided between placemen, pensioners, voters and mutants ; no attempts are made to reduce the publick debt ; the advantages we have gained are neglected ; due care is not taken to be ready for a fresh rupture, and the ministry for the time being is afraid of it, because of the opposition ;—I say, if this was the case, tho' we were to retain all our conquests, our enemies would soon be encouraged to renew hostilities. Let us make a right use of our new acquired and recovered territories, and be true to our own interests, and we need not fear the power of *France* was it to return to its past meridian : and without this, it will shortly prove terrible to us tho' in its decline. But to draw to a close. By the preliminary articles. We are to give back *Goree*, *Guadaloupe*, *Mariagalante*, *Desirade*, *Martinico*, *Belleisle*, and the *Havanna*. The *French* have their ruined comptoirs on the coasts of *Coromandel* and *Malabar*, and in *Bengal* restored to them under certain limitations. *St. Lucia* is to be delivered up to them. They have the liberty of fishing and drying, on a part of the coasts of *Newfoundland* as before ; and under restrictions, of fishing in the gulf of *St. Lawrence* ; and the islands of *St. Peter* and *Miquelon* are ceded to them, to

serve as a shelter for their fishermen. And then, we are to have no fortifications in the bay of *Honduras*, or any other places of the territory of *Spain* in that part of the world. This is the dark side, but instead of pouring incessantly upon it, and suffering it to engross our whole attention, till we lose ourselves in resentment and are become sple-netick, let us turn to the bright one. *Minorca* is to be restored to us. The town and port of *Dunkirk* is to be put into the state fixed by the treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle* and former ones. The countries belonging to the electorate of *Hanover*, the Landgrave of *Hesse*, the Duke of *Brunswick*, or to the Count of *La Lippe Buckebourg* possessed by the *French*, are to be restored. *France* evacuates *Ostend* and *Nieuport*, together with *Cleves*, *Wezel*, *Guelders*, and all the countries belonging to the King of *Prussia*, and withdraws its troops from *Germany*. *Portugal* is to have back all that the enemy hath taken. We are to have *St. Vincent*, *Dominica*, and *Tobago*, three out of the four neutral islands, the islands of *Grenada* and the *Grenadines*, *Senegal*, *Cape Breton*, *St. Johns*, *Anticoste*, and the other islands in the gulf of *St. Lawrence*, all *Canada*, and the whole country to the eastward of the *Mississippi* down to the gulf of *Mexico* (*New Orleans*, and the isle in which it is situated excepted) together with the free navigation of that river. We are also to have the whole of *Florida*, with the full and unmolested liberty of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood.

When

When all these things are laid together; and I consider, the lowering aspect attending the war at its first opening; the uncertainty necessarily accompanying its operations; the additional acquisitions we gain beyond what we should have had, supposing peace had been made in 1761; the losses of *France* and *Spain*; our new acquired and recovered territories; the immense gains we make at the expence of our enemies; the wound that their fishery will receive in the gulf of *St. Lawrence* by the limitations attending it; the ample security we obtain for our colonies on the continent of *America*; the honourable manner in which we get rid of our *German* connections, the deliverance of *Portugal*; the destruction of the family compact; and that we shall be no more embroiled in disputes about *American* limits, the right of cutting logwood, and a frivolous pretended *Spanish* right to a part in the fishery; I cannot but rejoice, notwithstanding the considerable restorations made by us. I am compelled to congratulate my country, and am forced to cry out, How unbecoming is it! to murmur and complain, instead of being thankful to Almighty God, that our case is not what we feared a few years ago in 1757, nor what we have deserved, nor that of our enemies. Let us bless, the Lord of hosts, the God of armies, the Governor of the universe, that we have not been acquainted with the horrors of war but the joys of success, that we have not lost but gained, and that we shall retain sufficient, if properly improved, to prevent


the danger for another war for many years. Let us hail the approaching peace; and be careful that we blast not the blessings of it, by our own dissensions.

I shall now have done troubling the public with my thoughts, hoping in their candour to excuse all faults. I have never troubled them in this way before, and shall scarce ever do it again. I have no interest to serve by it, but what is common to every individual of the community. I am of no party: have no acquaintance with the great: know the persons of none of them, my sovereign excepted: am in no place: depend upon the government only for protection in the enjoyment of the rights of society: and care not who is *in*, or who is *out*, if public affairs are managed for the best. Should curiosity excite to make a more particular inquiry concerning the author, I have made provision for baffling the same, being desirous of remaining

December
1762.

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